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INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in technology have expanded the boundaries of communities in which individuals interact with each other. For example, nowadays individuals can obtain valuable information or content from remotely located individuals in a community formed through networking services [1] [2] [4] . However, a large population and the anonymity of individuals in social communities make it difficult to sustain cooperative behavior among selfinterested individuals [3] . For example, it has been reported that so-called free-riding behavior is widely observed in peer-to-peer networks [5] [6] [7] [8] . Hence, incentive schemes are needed to provide individuals with incentives for cooperation.
The literature has proposed various incentive schemes. The popular forms of incentive devices used in many incentive schemes are payment and differential service. Pricing schemes use payments to reward and punish individuals for their behavior. Pricing schemes in principle can lead self-interested individuals to achieve social optimum by internalizing their external effects (see, for example, [9] [10]). However, it is often claimed that pricing schemes are impractical because they require an accounting infrastructure [11] . Moreover, the operators of social communities may be reluctant to adopt a pricing scheme when pricing discourages individuals' participation in community activities. Differential service schemes, on the other hand, reward and punish individuals by providing differential services depending on their behavior [12] . Differential services can be provided by community operators or by community members. Community operators can treat individuals differentially (for example, by varying the quality or scope of services) based on the information about the behavior of individuals. Incentive provision by a central entity can offer a robust method to sustain cooperation [13] [14] . However, it is impractical in a community with a large population because the burden of a central entity to monitor individuals' behavior and 2 provide differential services for them becomes prohibitively heavy as the number of individuals grows.
Alternatively, there are more distributed incentive schemes where community members monitor the behavior of each other and provide differential services based on their observations [15] [16] [17] [18] . Such incentive schemes are based on the principle of reciprocity and can be classified into personal reciprocation (or direct reciprocity) [15] [16] and social reciprocation (or indirect reciprocity) [17] [18] . In personal reciprocation schemes, individuals can identify each other, and behavior toward an individual is based on their personal experience with the individual.
Personal reciprocation is effective in sustaining cooperation in a small community where individuals interact frequently and can identify each other, but it loses its force in a large community where anonymous individuals with asymmetric interests interact infrequently [17] . In social reciprocation schemes, individuals obtain some information about other individuals (for example, rating) and decide their behavior toward an individual based on their information about that individual. Hence, an individual can be rewarded or punished by other individuals in the community who have not had direct interaction with it [17] [19] . Since social reciprocation requires neither observable identities nor frequent interactions, it has a potential to form a basis of successful incentive schemes for social communities. As such, this paper is devoted to the study of incentive schemes based on social reciprocation.
Sustaining cooperation using social reciprocation has been investigated in the economics literature using the framework of anonymous random matching games. Social norms have been proposed in [17] and [19] in order to sustain cooperation in a community with a large population of anonymous individuals. In an incentive scheme based on a social norm, each individual is attached a label indicating its reputation, status, etc. which contains information about its past behavior, and individuals with different labels are treated differently by other individuals they interact with. Hence, a social norm can be easily adopted in social communities with an infrastructure that collects, processes, and delivers information about individuals' behavior. However, [17] and [19] have focused on obtaining the Folk Theorem by characterizing the set of equilibrium payoffs that can be achieved by using a strategy based on a social norm when the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1. Our work, on the contrary, addresses the problem of designing a social norm given a discount factor and other parameters arising from practical considerations. Specifically, our work takes into account the following features of social communities:  Asymmetry of interests. As an example, consider a community where individuals with different areas of expertise share knowledge with each other. It will be rarely the case that a pair of individuals has a mutual interest in the expertise of each other. We allow the possibility of asymmetric interests by modeling the interaction between a pair of individuals as a gift-giving game, instead of a prisoner's dilemma game, which assumes mutual interests between a pair of individuals.
 Report errors.
In an incentive scheme based on a social norm, it is possible that the reputation (or label) of an individual is updated incorrectly because of errors in the report of individuals. Our model incorporates the possibility of report errors, which allows us to analyze its impact on design and performance, whereas most existing works on reputation schemes [15] [20] [18] adopt an idealized assumption that reputations are always updated correctly.
 Dynamic change in the population. The members of a community change over time as individuals gain or lose interest in the services provided by community members. We model this feature by having a constant fraction of 3 individuals leave and join the community in every period. This allows us to study the impact of population turnover on design and performance.
 Whitewashing reputations. In an online community, individuals with bad reputations may attempt to whitewash their reputations by joining the community as new members [15] . We consider this possibility and study the design of whitewash-proof social norms and their performance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the repeated matching game and incentive schemes based on a social norm. In Section III, we formulate the problem of designing an optimal social norm. In Section IV, we provide analytical results about optimal social norms. In Section V, we extend our model to address the impacts of variable punishment lengths and whitewashing possibility. We provide simulation results in Section VI, and we conclude the paper in Section VII.
II. MODEL

A. Repeated Matching Game
We consider a community where agents can offer a valuable service to other agents. Examples of services are expert knowledge, customer reviews, job information, multimedia files, storage space, and computing power. We consider an infinite-horizon discrete time model with a continuum of agents [15] [22] . In a period, each agent generates a service request [27] [29], which is sent to another agent that can provide the requested service. We model the request generation and agent selection process by uniform random matching, where each agent receives exactly one request in every period, each agent is equally likely to receive the request from a particular agent, and the matching is independent across periods. In a pair of matched agents, the agent that requests a service is called a client while the agent that receives a service request is called a server. In every period, each agent in the community is involved in two matches, one as a client and the other as a server. Note that the agent with whom an agent interacts as a client can be different from that with which it interacts as a server, reflecting asymmetric interests between a pair of agents.
We model the interaction between a pair of matched agents as a gift-giving game [23] . In a gift-giving game, the server has the binary choice of whether to fulfill or decline the request, while the client has no choice. The server's action determines the payoffs of both agents. If the server fulfils the client's request, the client receives a service benefit of 0 b > while the server suffers a service cost of 0 c > . We assume that b c > so that the service of an agent creates a positive net social benefit. If the server declines the request, both agents receive zero payoffs.
The set of actions for the server is denoted by
, where F stands for "fulfill" and D for "decline". The payoff matrix of the gift-giving game is presented in Table 1 . An agent plays the gift-giving game repeatedly with changing partners until it leaves the community. We assume that at the end of each period a fraction
of agents in the current population leave and the same amount of new agents join the community. We refer to a as the turnover rate [15] .
Social welfare in a time period is measured by the average payoff of the agents in that period. Since b c > , social welfare is maximized when all the servers choose action F in the gift-giving game they play, which yields payoff b c -to every agent. On the contrary, action D is the dominant strategy for the server in the gift-giving 4 game, which can be considered as the myopic equilibrium of the gift-giving game. When every server chooses its action to maximize its current payoff myopically, an inefficient outcome arises where every agent receives zero payoffs. Server
B. Incentive Schemes Based on a Social Norm
In order to improve the efficiency of the myopic equilibrium, we use incentive schemes based on social norms.
A social norm is defined as the rules that a group uses to regulate the behavior of members. These rules indicate the established and approved ways of "operating" (e.g. exchanging services) in the group: adherence to these rules is positively rewarded, while failure to follow these rules results in (possibly severe) punishments [26] . This gives social norms a potential to provide incentives for cooperation. We consider a social norm that consists of a reputation scheme and a social strategy, as in [17] and [19] . A reputation scheme determines the reputations of agents depending on their past actions as a server, while a social strategy prescribes the actions that servers should take depending on the reputations of the matched agents.
Formally, a reputation scheme is represented by three elements ( ) , , K t .  is the set of reputations that an agent can hold,  K Î is the initial reputation attached to newly joining agents, and is the reputation update rule.
After a server takes an action, the client sends a report (or feedback) about the action of the server to the third-party device or infrastructure that manages the reputations of agents, but the report is subject to errors with a small probability e . That is, with probability e , D is reported when the server takes action F, and vice versa. Assuming a binary set of reports, it is without loss of generality to restrict e in [ ] , s is the approved action for a server with reputation q that is matched with a client with reputation q  . 1 To simplify our analysis, we initially impose the following restrictions on reputation schemes we consider. 2 1)  is a nonempty finite set, i.e.,
3) t is defined by
Note that with the above three restrictions a nonnegative integer L completely describes a reputation scheme, and thus a social norm can be represented by a pair
We call the reputation scheme determined by L the maximum punishment reputation scheme with punishment length L . In the maximum punishment reputation scheme with punishment length L , there are 1 L + reputations, and the initial reputation is specified as L . If the reported action of the server is the same as that specified by the social strategy s , the server's reputation is increased by 1 while not exceeding L . Otherwise, the server's reputation is set as 0 . A schematic representation of a maximum punishment reputation scheme is provided in Fig 1. Below we summarize the sequence of events in a time period: 1) Agents generate service requests and are matched.
2) Each server observes the reputation of its client and then determines its action.
3) Each client reports the action of its server.
4) The reputations of agents are updated, and each agent observes its new reputation for the next period. 5) A fraction of agents leave the community, and the same amount of new agents join the community.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Stationary Distribution of Reputations
As time passes, the reputations of agents are updated and agents leave and join the community. Thus, the distribution of reputations evolves over time. Let ( ) t h q be the fraction of q -agents in the total population at the beginning of an arbitrary period t , where a q -agent means an agent with reputation q . Suppose that all the agents in the community follow a given social strategy s . Then the transition from { } 0 ( )
is determined by the reputation update rule , taking into account the turnover rate a and the error probability e , as shown in the following expressions:
h a e h h a
Since we are interested in the long-term payoffs of the agents, we study the distribution of reputations in the long run. 
The following lemma shows the existence of and convergence to a unique stationary distribution. 
Moreover, the stationary distribution ( ) { } h q is reached within ( 1) L + periods starting from any initial distribution.
h q a e e q a e e a h a e 
It is easy to see from the expressions in (2) that ( ) h q is reached within ( 1) q + periods, for all q , starting from any initial distribution. ■ Since the coefficients in the equations that define a stationary distribution are independent of the social strategy that the agents follow, the stationary distribution is also independent of the social strategy, as can be seen in (4).
Thus, we will write the stationary distribution as { ( )} L h q to emphasize its dependence on the reputation scheme, which is represented by L .
B. Sustainable Social Norms
We now investigate the incentive of agents to follow a prescribed social strategy. For simplicity, we check the incentive of agents at the stationary distribution of reputations, as in [19] and [21] . Since we consider a noncooperative scenario, we need to check whether an agent can improve its long-term payoff by a unilateral deviation.
Note that any unilateral deviation from an individual agent would not affect the evolution of reputations and thus the stationary distribution, 3 because we consider a continuum of agents.
Let ( ) , c s be the cost suffered by a server with reputation q that is matched with a client with reputation q  7 and follows a social strategy , i.e., ( )
, b s be the benefit received by a client with reputation q  that is matched with a server with reputation q following a social strategy s , i.e.,
Since we consider uniform random matching, the expected period payoff of a q -agent under social norm k before it is matched is given by
To evaluate the long-term payoff of an agent, we use the discounted sum criterion in which the long-term payoff of an agent is given by the expected value of the sum of discounted period payoffs from the current period. Let ( ) ' | p kbe the transition probability that a q -agent becomes a ' q -agent in the next period under social norm k .
Since we consider maximum punishment reputation schemes,
Then we can compute the long-term payoff of an agent from the current period (before it is matched) by solving the following recursive equations
where
is the weight that an agent puts on its future payoff. Since an agent leaves the community with probability a at the end of the current period, the expected future payoff of a q -agent is given by
, assuming that an agent receives zero payoff once it leaves the community. The expected future payoff is multiplied by a common discount factor
, which reflects the time preference, or patience, of agents.
Now suppose that an agent deviates and uses a social strategy
' s under social norm k . Since the deviation of a single agent does not affect the stationary distribution, the expected period payoff of a deviating q -agent is given
| , p k s be the transition probability that a q -agent using social strategy 
gives the transition probability of a q -agent before knowing the reputation of its client, and the long-term payoff of a deviating agent from the current period (before it is matched) can be computed by solving
In our model, a server decides whether to provide a service or not after it is matched with a client and observes the reputation of the client. Hence, we check the incentive for a server to follow a social strategy at the point when it knows the reputation of the client. Suppose that a server with reputation q is matched with a client with reputation q  . When the server follows the social strategy s prescribed by social norm k , it receives the long-term
, excluding the possible benefit as a client. On the contrary, when the server deviates to a social strategy s¢ , it receives the long-term payoff
again excluding the possible benefit as a client. By comparing these two payoffs, we can check whether a q -agent has an incentive to deviate to ' s when it is matched with a client with reputation q  .
Definition 2 (Sustainable social norms)
In words, a social norm
is sustainable if no agent can gain from a unilateral deviation regardless of the reputation of the client it is matched with when every other agent follows social strategy s and the reputations are determined by the maximum punishment reputation scheme with punishment length L. Thus, under a sustainable social norm, agents follow the prescribed social strategy in their self-interest. Checking whether a social norm is sustainable using the above definition requires computing deviation gains from all possible social strategies, whose computation complexity can be quite high for moderate values of L. By employing the criterion of unimprovability in Markov decision theory [28] , we establish the one-shot deviation principle for sustainable social norms, which provides simpler conditions. For notation, let be the cost suffered by a server that takes action a , and let 
Lemma 2 (One-shot Deviation Principle). A social norm k is sustainable if and only if
for all a Î  , for all ( ) (12) can be interpreted as the current gain from choosing a , while the right-hand side of (12) represents the discounted expected future loss due to the different transition probabilities induced by choosing a .
Using the one-shot deviation principle, we can derive incentive constraints that characterize sustainable social norms.
First, consider a pair of reputations ( )
If the server with reputation q serves the client, it suffers the service cost of c in the current period while its reputation in the next period becomes
with probability (1 ) e -and 0 with probability e . Thus, the expected long-term payoff of a qagent when it provides a service is given by { } ( )
On the contrary, if a q -agent deviates and declines the service request, it avoids the cost of c in the current period while its reputation in the next period becomes 0 with probability (1 )
with probability e .
Thus, the expected long-term payoff of a q -agent when it does not provide a service is given by { } ( )
The incentive constraint that a q -agent does not gain from a one-shot deviation is given by ( ; )
which can be expressed as
Now, consider a pair of reputations ( )
Using a similar argument as above, we can
show that the incentive constraint that a q -agent does not gain from a one-shot deviation can be expressed as
Note that (15) implies (16), and thus for q such that ( ) (15) and (16) can be interpreted as the loss from punishment that social norm k applies to a q -agent for not following the social strategy. Therefore, in order to induce a q -agent to provide a service to some clients, the left-hand side should be at least as large as the service cost c , which can be interpreted as the deviation 10 gain. We use
to measure the strength of the incentive for cooperation under social norm k , where cooperation means providing the requested service in our context.
C. Social Norm Design Problem
Since we assume that the community operates at the stationary distribution of reputations, social welfare under social norm k can be computed by
We assume that the community operator aims to choose a social norm that maximizes social welfare among sustainable social norms. Then the problem of designing a social norm can be formally expressed as
, such that such that , ,
A social norm that solves the design problem (18) is called an optimal social norm.
IV. ANALYSIS OF OPTIMAL SOCIAL NORMS
A. Optimal Value of the Design Problem
We first investigate whether there exists a sustainable social norm, i.e., whether the design problem (18) Assuming that an optimal social norm exists, let * U be the optimal value of the design problem (18) . In the following proposition, we study the properties of
(ii)
Proof: See Appendix A. ■
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We obtain zero social welfare at myopic equilibrium, without using a social norm. Hence, we are interested in whether we can sustain a social norm in which agents cooperate in a positive proportion of matches. In other words, we look for conditions on the parameters ( , , , , ) b c b a e that yield * 0 U > . From Proposition 1(ii) and (iii), we can
as necessary and sufficient conditions for * 0 U > , respectively. Moreover, when there are no report errors (i.e., 0 e = ), we can interpret
as necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve the maximum social welfare 
B. Optimal Social Strategies Given a Punishment Length
In order to obtain analytical results, we consider the design problem (18) s to denote the optimal value and the optimal social strategy of DP L , respectively. We first show that increasing the punishment length cannot decrease the optimal value.
, we have
It may be the case that the incentive constraints eventually prevent the optimal value from increasing with L so that the supremum is attained by some finite L . If the supremum is not attained, the protocol designer can set an upper bound on L based on practical consideration. Now we analyze the structure of optimal social strategies given a punishment length. 
Proof: See Appendix C. ■
C. Illustration with L=1 and L= 2
We can represent a social strategy L s as an 
= , provided that 0 e > and 1 a < . Hence, among the total of 16 possible social strategies, only four can be optimal social strategies. These four social strategies are
The following proposition specifies the optimal social strategy given the parameters. 
. We obtain that ( ) 
Thus, we have
By choosing the social strategy that yields the highest social welfare among feasible ones, we obtain the result. ■ Proposition 4 shows that the optimal social strategy is determined by the ratio of the service cost and benefit, / c b . When / c b is sufficiently small, the social strategy
s can be sustained, yielding the highest social welfare among the four candidate social strategies. As / c b increases, the optimal social strategy changes from s and eventually to 4 1 s . Fig 2 shows the optimal social strategies with 1 L = as c varies. The parameters we use to obtain the results in the figures of this paper are set as follows unless otherwise stated:
e =
, and 10 b = . Fig 2(a) plots the incentive for cooperation of the four social strategies. We can find the region of c in which each strategy is sustained by comparing the incentive for cooperation with the service cost c 
Proposition 5. Suppose that 0 e > , 1 a < , and
Proof:
We can show that, under the given conditions, any change from . We obtain that
and ( ) ( ) ( ) (27) Note that 
V. EXTENSIONS
A. Reputation Schemes with Shorter Punishment Length
So far we have focused on maximum punishment reputation schemes under which any deviation in reported actions results in the reputation of 0. Although this class of reputation schemes is simple in that a reputation scheme can be identified with the number of reputations, it may not yield the highest social welfare among all possible reputation schemes when there are report errors. When there is no report error, i.e., 0 e = , an agent maintains reputation L as long as it follows the prescribed social strategy. Thus, in this case, punishment exists only as a threat and it does not result in an efficiency loss. On the contrary, when 0 e > and 1 a < , there exist a positive proportion of agents with reputations 0 to 1 L -in the stationary distribution even if all the agents follow the social strategy. Thus, there is a tension between efficiency and incentive. In order to sustain a social norm, we need to provide a strong punishment so that agents do not gain by deviation. At the same time, too severe a punishment reduces social welfare. This observation suggests that, in the presence of report errors, it is optimal to provide incentives just enough to prevent deviations. If we can provide a weaker punishment while sustaining the same social strategy, it will improve social welfare. One way to provide a weaker punishment is to use a random punishment. For example, we can consider a reputation scheme under which the reputation of a q -agent becomes 0 in the next period with probability (0,1]Î and remains the same with probability 1-when it reportedly deviates from the social strategy. By varying the punishment probabilityfor q -agents, we can adjust the severity of the punishment applied to q -agents. This class of reputation schemes can be identified by . Maximum punishment reputation schemes can be considered as a special case where 1= for all q . 16 Another way to provide a weaker punishment is to use a smaller punishment length, denoted M . Under the reputation scheme with ( 1) L + reputations and punishment length M , reputations are updated by
When a q -agent reportedly deviates from the social strategy, its reputation is reduced by M in the next period if M q ³ and becomes 0 otherwise. Note that this reputation scheme is analogous to real-world reputation schemes for credit rating and auto insurance risk rating. This class of reputation schemes can be identified by ( , ) L M with 1 M L £ £ . 4 Maximum punishment reputation schemes can be considered as a special case where M L = .
In this paper, we focus on the second approach to investigate the impacts of the punishment length on the social welfare U k and the incentive for cooperation
social norm k , which is now defined as ( , , ) L M s . The punishment length M affects the evolution of the reputation distribution, and the stationary distribution of reputations with the reputation scheme ( , )
satisfies the following equations:
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0 1 , ( ) ( )
. This shows that, as the punishment length increases, there are more agents holding a lower reputation. As a result, when the community adopts a social strategy that treats an agent with a higher reputation better, increasing the punishment length reduces social welfare while it increases the incentive for cooperation. This trade-off is illustrated in Fig 5, which plots social welfare and the incentive for cooperation under a social norm In general, the social strategy adopted in the community is determined together with the reputation scheme in order to maximize social welfare while satisfying the incentive constraints. The design problem with variable punishment lengths can be formulated as follows. First, note that the expected period payoff of a q -agent, ( ) v k q , can be computed by (6) , with the modification of the stationary distribution to
Agents' long-term payoffs can be obtained by solving (8) , with the transition probabilities now given by Finally, the design problem can be written as
We find the optimal social strategy given a reputation scheme ( , ) L M for 3 L = and 1, 2, 3 M = , and plot the social welfare and the incentive for cooperation of the optimal social strategies in Fig 6. Since different values of M induce different optimal social strategies given the value of L , there are no monotonic relationships between the punishment length and social welfare as well as the incentive for cooperation, unlike in Fig 5. The optimal punishment length given L can be obtained by taking the punishment length that yields the highest social welfare, which is plotted in Fig 7. We can see that, as the service cost c increases, the optimal punishment length increases from 1 to 2 to 3 before cooperation becomes no longer sustainable. This result is intuitive in that larger c requires a stronger incentive for cooperation, which can be achieved by having a larger punishment length.
B. Whitewash-Proof Social Norms
So far we have restricted our attention to reputation schemes where newly joining agents are endowed with the highest reputation, i.e., K L = , without worrying about the possibility of whitewashing. We now make the initial reputation K as a choice variable of the design problem while assuming that agents can whitewash their reputations in order to obtain reputation K [15] . At the end of each period, agents can decide whether to whitewash their reputations or not after observing their reputations for the next period. If an agent chooses to whitewash its reputation, then it leaves and rejoins the community with a fraction of agents and receives initial reputation K .
The cost of whitewashing is denoted by 0 w c ³ .
The incentive constraints in the design problem (18) are aimed at preventing agents from deviating from the prescribed social strategy. In the presence of potential whitewashing attempts, we need additional incentive constraints to prevent agents from whitewashing their reputations. A social norm k is whitewash-proof if and only
is the gain from whitewashing for an agent whose reputation is updated as q . If
there is no net gain from whitewashing for a qagent. We measure the incentive for whitewashing under a social norm k by
norm is more effective in preventing whitewashing as the incentive for whitewashing is smaller.
To simplify our analysis, we fix the punishment length at M L = so that a reputation scheme is represented by
be the stationary distribution of reputations under reputation scheme
Now an optimal social norm is the one that maximizes social welfare among sustainable and whitewash-proof social norms. Note that the design problem (32) always has a feasible solution for any 0 
-, the whitewash-proof constraint is satisfied for any choice of ( , , ) L K s . ■ Now we investigate the impacts of the initial reputation K on social welfare and the incentive for whitewashing.
We first consider the case where the social strategy is fixed. Fig 8 plots social welfare and the incentive for whitewashing under a social norm
We can see that larger K yields higher social welfare and at the same time a larger incentive for whitewashing since new agents are treated better. Hence, there is a trade-off between efficiency and whitewash-proofness as we increase K while fixing the social strategy. Next we consider the optimal social strategy given a reputation scheme ( , ) L K . Fig 9 plots social welfare and the incentive for whitewashing under the optimal social strategy for 3 L = and 0, , 3 K =  . We can see that giving the highest reputation to new agents ( 3 K = ) yields the highest social welfare but it can prevent whitewashing only for small 5 This condition assumes that an agent can whitewash its reputation only once in its lifespan in the community. More generally, we can consider the case where an agent can whitewash its reputation multiple times. For example, an agent can use a deterministic stationary decision rule for whitewashing, which can be represented by a function : { 0 ,1 } w   , where ( ) 1 w q = (resp. ( ) 0 w q = ) means that the agent whitewashes (resp. does not whitewash) its reputation if it holds reputation q in the next period. This will yield a different expression for the gain from whitewashing.
19
values of c . With our parameter specification, choosing 3 K = is optimal only for small c , and optimal K drops to 0 for other values of c with which some cooperation can be sustained. Fig 10 plots becomes more difficult to sustain cooperation while the difference between
increases for all q such that ( , ) F s=  for some q  . As a result, * K is non-increasing in c .
VI. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate in detail the performance of optimal social norms.
Unless stated otherwise, the setting of the community is as follows: the benefit per service ( 10 b = ), the cost per service ( 1 c = ), the discount factor ( 0.8 b = ), the turnover rate ( 0.1 a = ), the report error ( 0.2 e = ), the punishment step ( M L = ), and the initial reputation ( K L = ). Since the number of all possible social strategies given a punishment length L increases exponentially with L , it takes a long time to compute the optimal social strategy even for a moderate value of L . Hence, we consider social norms
We first compare the performances of the optimal social norm and the fixed social norm for Next, we analyze the impacts of the community's parameters on the performance of optimal social norms.
Impact of the Discount Factor:
We discuss the impact of the discount factor b on the performance of optimal social norms. As b increases, an agent puts a higher weight on its future payoff relative to its instant payoff. Hence, with larger b , it is easier to sustain cooperation using future reward and punishment through a social norm. This is illustrated in Fig 12(a) , which shows that social welfare is non-decreasing in b .
Impact of the Turnover Rate:
Increasing a has two opposite effects on social welfare. As a increases, the weight on the future payoffs,
-, decreases, and thus it becomes more difficult to sustain cooperation.
On the other hand, as a increases, there are more agents holding the highest reputation given the restriction
In general, agents with the highest reputation are treated well under optimal social strategies, which implies a positive effect of increasing a on social welfare. From Fig 12(b) , we can see that, when a is large, the first effect is dominant, making cooperation not sustainable. We can also see that the second effect is dominant for 20 the values of a with which cooperation can be sustained, yielding an increasing tendency of social welfare with respect to a .
Impact of the Report Errors:
As e increases, it becomes more difficult to sustain cooperation because reward and punishment provided by a social norm becomes more random. At the same time, larger e increases the fraction of 0 -agents in the stationary distribution, which usually receive the lowest long-term payoff among all reputations. Therefore, we can expect that optimal social welfare has a non-increasing tendency with respect to e , as illustrated in Fig 12(c) . When e is sufficiently close to 1/2,
D L
s is the only sustainable social strategy and social welfare falls to 0 . On the other direction, as e approaches 0, social welfare converges to its upper bound b c -, regardless of the punishment length, as can be seen from Proposition 1(iii). We can also observe from Fig 12 that the regions of a and e where some cooperation can be sustained (i.e.,
whereas that of b is independent of L .
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we used the idea of social norms to establish a rigorous framework for the design and analysis of a class of incentive schemes to sustain cooperation in online social communities. We derived conditions for sustainable social norms, under which no agent gains by deviating from the prescribed social strategy. We formulated the problem of designing an optimal social norm and characterized optimal social welfare and optimal social strategies given parameters. We also discussed the impacts of punishment lengths and whitewashing possibility on the design and performance of optimal social norms, identifying a trade-off between efficiency and incentives. Lastly, we presented numerical results to illustrate the impacts of the discount factor, the turnover rate, and the probability of report errors on the performance of optimal social norms. Our framework will provide a foundation of incentive schemes to be deployed in real-world communities, encouraging cooperation among anonymous, self-interested individuals.
L s is feasible. Note that the objective function can be rewritten as
(ii) By (8), we can express
Similarly, we have
where we define ( 
for all q . In other words, with 0 D L s each agent declines the service request of 0-agents while providing a service to other agents. Consider a social norm L s be an optimal social norm that achieves
Choose an arbitrary L . To prove the result, we will construct a social strategy . From (4), we have
Using this and (6), it is straightforward to see that ( ) ( ) 
